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POSED PHOTOGRAPHS: ADMISSIBILITY
By JAcK H. CnABERs*
Considering the prevailing widespread use of photographs in
the courtroom, it is not surprising that the courts have frequently
been faced with the question whether a party may introduce photo-
graphs which, as the proffering party contends, reproduce the scene
existing at the time in question, i.e., posed photographs. The num-
ber of decisions on the admissibility of such photographs and the
difference in the results the courts have reached indicate that this is
a matter worthy of consideration.
In this discussion of posed photographs it will be necessary to
separate certain types and purposes of such pictures. At the out-
set, it is necessary to distinguish pictures of reproduced scenes
offered as independent evidence which is intended to stand alone
and have its own probative value.' Such photographs stand in
their own right as separate evidence, and do not involve the same
considerations as our question here. This comment is concerned
solely with the use of "posed photographs" to illustrate other
evidence in the case, not as independent evidence.
Having given this limitation to "posed photographs," it may
be well to summarily dispose of two types of cases pertaining to
such photographs where the courts are in general agreement.
Where a photograph of a hypothetical situation is not verified by
any witness as being a true representation of the scene as the wit-
ness saw it, but is a mere possibility of what the scene might have
been, the photograph is clearly inadmissible.2 But where a photo-
graph is illustrative of a witness' testimony, and the opposing party
does not deny its accuracy as to any relevant matter or object, it is
equally settled that the photographs are admissible.8
* 3rd year law student, Duke University; A.B. Duke, 1951.
See, for example, Riggs v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. 216 Mo. 304, 115
S.W. 969 (1908); Lewis v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 155 Minn. 381, 193
N.W. 695 (1923).
2 "A map, picture, or diagram is, for evidential purposes simply nothing,
except so far as it has a human being's credit to support it." 3 WiwonRO,
EvIDECE § 790, at p. 174 (3rd ed. 1940). Sellers v. State, 91 Ark. 175, 120
S.W. 840 (1909), aff'd 93 Ark. 313, 124 S.W. 770 (1910); Colonial Refining
v. Lathrop, 64 Okla. 47, 166 Pac. 747 (1917); Barnes v. Scott, 243 S.W.2d.
133 (Tenn. Ct. of App. 1950).
2Wilson v. State, 53 S.2d 559 (Ala. 1951); Commonwealth v. Carelli, 181
Pa. 602, 127 Atl. 305 (1925); People v. Jackson, 111 N.Y. 362, 19 N.E. 54
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The conflict in authority occurs where a posed photograph is
merely used by a witness to illustrate his testimony as to the posi-
tion of objects or persons at a relevant place, such position being
one of the contested issues at the trial or'at least having bearing
on a contested point. This question has often arisen, and various
reasons have been given for both admitting and excluding photo-
graphs of this nature.
Rationale
Probably the strongest reason for the refusal to admit such
photographs is the fear that they will tend to speak for themselves
and weigh too heavily with the jury, instead of being taken as mere-
ly illustrating one witness' testimony of what happened. 4 But, as
Wigmore himself points out, there is this same danger attached to
all non-oral testimony.5
A second important reason against admitting such photographs
is the strong danger of fraud or suggestion involved. There is a
well-recognized danger that any photograph may be taken with
such use of angles, lighting, etc., as to be deceptive and not a fair
representation of the objects portrayed. With posed photographs,
there is the added danger that the party making up such pictures
can persuade the witness who will testify to them to remember the
scene in the manner most favorable to his theory. The opponents
of this argument would answer that there is this danger present
in any evidence, and that the danger is only slightly enhanced
in these photographs.
A third reason, given at least by the Kentucky Court, is that
these photographic re-creations are "self-serving.' '7 Of course,
the mere fact that evidence is self-serving alone has never been
deemed sufficient reason for excluding it. And the argument, at
least as advanced by the Kentucky cases, seems to make the fal-
lacious assumption that such photographs are intended to corrob-
orate witnesses, not merely to illustrate their testimony.
That posed photographs will raise certain collateral issues and
will take up the trial judge's time in examination is beyond ques-
(1888). This is provided, of course, that the photographs meet the other
general requirements for admissibility of photographs.
'Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 798a. People v. Dabb, 197 P.2d 1
(Calif. Sup. Ct. 1948). Fore v. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710 (1898).
1 Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 790.
'Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N. 0. L. RBv. 233, 235 (1946).
"Welch v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 163 Ky. 100, 173 S.W. 338 (1915);
Nunnelley's Adm'r v. Muth, 195 Ky. 352, 242 S.W. 622 (1922).
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tion. But this argument against admission is no truer of posed
photographs than of any other type, and has not prevailed against
the acceptance of photographs in general.
A final objection is that photographs do register strongly in
the minds of jurors. Permitting one party to bring in photo-
graphs to indicate his version of the scene in question may, as a
practical matter, require the other party to make up similar pic-
tures or stand in an inferior position in its presentation of the
case. This would tend, of course, to increase the cost of litigation.
While this alone has never been a reason for excluding evidence,
at least one court has considered the point in discussing posed
photographs.8 ,
Courts admitting posed photographs often start with the long
established rule that a witness may use maps, plats, or diagrams to
illustrate his testimony.9
"It would be folly to deny ourselves on the witness stand
those effective media of communication commonly employed
at other times as a superior substitute for words."10
A large number of courts admitting posed photographs do so
by analogizing the use of such photographs to the use of plats, etc.,
under this rule. That photographs are as effective as these other
documents, and a "superior substitute for words," is beyond ques-
tion."1 Moreover, the analogy seems logically correct. If a witness
may indicate the positions of various parties on a map, why may he
not use a photograph showing these parties in the same position
to illustrate his testimony ? Or, if a witness is allowed to mark a
map so as to indicate his version of the position of cars involved in
an accident, why may he not use a photograph of the cars posed
in that position? Courts are increasingly recognizing the im-
portance and usefulness of photographs. They present to the court
an understanding which prolonged oral testimony often will not
give. There is no reason why posed photographs are not equally
valuable in illustrating the testimony of a witness, by presenting
that testimony in such a way that it may actually be visualized by
the jury.
8 Nunnelley 's Adm 'r v. Muth, supra at note 7.
W TVignore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 790.
10 Ibid.
11 Gardner, op. cit. supra note 6, makes this point quite well in the intro-
duction to his subject.
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In final analysis, the increased danger of fraud peculiar to posed
photographs must be weighed against their communicative value.
Only the additional danger of fraud or suggestion separate this
question from that of the admissibility of ordinary photographs.
Though this additional danger is certainly a factor, and will give
rise to additional problems for the trial judge which will be dis-
cussed later, it seems insufficient reason for completely barring this
helpful aid to the presentation of evidence.
Majority View Favors Admissibility
There can be no doubt that the majority of states having de-
cisions on the admissibility of posed photographs prefer the view
that such photographs are admissible to illustrate testimony.
12
"Alabama: Wilson v. State, -a.--, 53 S.2d 559 (1951).
Arkansas: Sellers v. State, 91 Ark. 175, 120 S.W. 840 (1909) aff'd 93 Ark.
313, 124 S.W. 770 (1910). Washington v. State, 181 Ark. 1011, 28 S.W.2d. 443
(1930).
California: People v. Sliscovich, 193 Cal. 544, 226 Pac. 611 (1924). People
v. Dabb, 32 Ca.2d 491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948).
Florida: Baston v. Shelton, -Fla.-, 13 S.2d. 453 (1943).
Georgia: Shaw v. State, 83 Ga. 92, 9 S.E. 768 (1889); Rose v. State, 184
Ga. 451, 191 S.E. 426 (1937).
Michigan: Harrison v. Green, 157 Mich. 690, 122 N.W. 205 (1909) ; Pearce
v. odell, 283 Mich. 19, 276 N.W. 883 (1937).
Montana: Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P.2d
1025 (1934).
New York: People v. Jackson, 111 N.Y. 362, 19 N.E. 54 ,1889); People v.
Veld, 154 App.Div. 752, 139 N.Y.Supp. 788 (2nd. Dep't. 1913).
Nevada: State v. Williams, 50 Nev. 271, 257 Pac. 619 (1927).
North Carolina: State v. Matthews, 191 N.C. 378, 131 S.E. 743 (1926).
South Carolina: State v. Kelley, 46 S.C. 55, 24 S.E. 60 (1896).
Tennessee: Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40, 148 S.W. 543 (1912).
Virginia: Moore v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 453, 42 S.E.2d. 871 (1947).
And admissible at the discretion of the trial judge:
Colorado: Reed v. Davidson Dairy Co., 97 Colo. 462, 50 P.2d. 532 (1935).
Indiana: City of Huntington v. Luseh, 33 Ind. App. 476, 70 N.E. 402
(1904); Central Indiana Ry. Co. v. Mitchell, 102 Ind.App. 121, 199 N.E.
439 (1936).
Iowa: State v. Ebelsheiser, 43 N.W.2d. 706, 242 Iowa 49 (1951).
Maryland: Kirsch v. Ford, 170 Md. 90, 183 Atl. 240 (1936).
Minnesota: O'Neil v. Potts, 130 Minn. 353, 153 N.W. 856 (1915); Lentz
v. Minneapolis & St. Paul Suburban R. Co., 135 Minn. 310, 160 N.W. 794
(1917).
Texas: Richardson v. Missouri-Kans.-Texas R. Co., 205 S.W.2d. 819 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947).
Vermont: Hutchinson v. Knowles, 108 Vt. 195, 184 At]. 705 (1936).
Huckabee v. Montgomery, 113 Vt. 75, 29 A.2d. 810 (1943).
Washington: Fabbio v. Diesel Oil Sales Co., 1 Wash. 2d. 234, 95 P.2d. 788
(1939).
Federal: Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. Robinson, 101 P.2d. 994 (8th Cir. 1939).
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There is, however, a substantial minority group to the contrary,13
though even some of these courts say that admission may be error
but not reversible error.14 Further, a number of the cases generally
cited for the proposition that such photographs are inadmissible
for any purpose must be examined before the true strength of the
minority line of authority may be evaluated.
One of the cases most frequently cited for the proposition that
posed photographs are inadmissible is Weloh v. Louisville N. R.
Co.'5 In that case the plaintiff was struck by flying parts from a
wreck of defendant's train and handcar. Since the court felt that
it was too late for defendant's employees to avoid the wreck after
plaintiff's danger was discovered, the only question was whether
defendant was under a duty to be on the lookout for the safety of
plaintiff. The answer to this question depended on whether plain-
tiff was on a public road adjacent to defendant's railway. The
plaintiff offered in evidence a posed photograph of herself stand-
ing in the middle of the roadway. But on direct examination plain-
tiff persisted in answering her own counsel's question as to her posi-
tion by stating that she was just off the roadway. No other witness
testified as to plaintiff's position. The picture was excluded, and
the Kentucky Court of Appeals sustained this exclusion, affirming
a judgment for defendant. Though the Court only intimated this
reason, it is clear that the photograph did not illustrate the testi-
mony of any witness, but was, in fact, contrary to the introducing
"" Illinois: Ellis v. Flannagan, 253 Ill. 397, 97 N.E. 696 (1912); People v.
Crowe, 390 Ill. 294, 61 N.E.2d. 348 (1945).
Hentuck.y: Welch v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 163 Ky. 100, 173 S.W. 338
(1915) ; Nunnelley's Adm'r v. Muth, 195 Ky. 352, 242 S.W. 622 (1922). But
see also Square Deal Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 307 Ky. 135, 210 S.W.2d.
340 (1948); and Hillman v. Hall, 311 Ky. 790, 225 S.W.2d. 667 (1949).
Maine: Babb v. Oxford Paper Co., 99 Me. 298, 59 Atl. 290 (1904).
Rodiek v. Maine Central R. Co., 109 me. 530, 85 Atl. 41 (1912).
Mississippi: Fore v. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 So. 710 (1898).
Missouri: Lynch v. Missouri-Kans-Texas R. Co., 333 Mo. 89, 61 S.W.2d.
918 (1933).
New Jersey: Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. 1. Co., 81 N.J.L. 536, 80
Atl. 327 (1911).
North Dakota: Wyldes v. Patterson, 31 N.D. 282, 153 N.W. 630 (1915).
O7lahoma: Massey v. Ivester, 168 Okla. 464, 33 P.2d. 765 (1934) ; Defiance
Oils, Inc. v. Hardzog, 178 Okla. 6, 61 P.2d. 572 (1936).
Pennsylvania: Buck v. City of McKeesport, 223 Pa. 211, 72 Atl. 514
(1909).
'4 Ellis v. Flannagan, 253 Ill. 397, 97 N.E. 696 (1912); Hillman v. Hall, 311
Ky. 790, 225 S.W.2d. 667 (1949); Bodiek v. Maine Central R. Co., 109 Me.
530, 85 AtI. 41 (1912); Patrick v. Sliskis, 105 0kla. 51, 222 Pac. 543 (1924).
15163 Ky. 100, 173 S.W. 338 (1915).
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party's own testimony. Under these circumstances, the photograph
was not relevant, since it did not aid the presentation of the actual
evidence bearing upon plaintiff's position, and it could not, there-
fore, have been admitted. It is true that the Kentucky Court itself
has later taken the Welcl case to stand for the general proposition
that posed photographs are inadmissible.'e But clearly the case on
its facts does not stand for the general proposition that posed
photographs are never admissible to illustrate a witness' testimony.
Riggs v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co.17 is another leading case
frequently cited in favor of excluding posed photographs. An
examination of the case shows that in the photographs plaintiff was
shown in a sitting position. The only witness testifying that this
was the actual position of plaintiff was plantiff himself, who, as the
court points out, was admittedly unconscious at the time, and
could not have known the condition of the scene. Too, the photo-
graphs were not offered as mere illustrations, but were intended as
evidence tending to show that the driver of defendant's trolley
should have seen plaintiff upon the track in time to avoid injuring
him. Thus, the photographs were part of an experiment in which,
as pointed out above, the conditions were not shown to be similar
to those actually existing at the relevant time. While it is true that
the Missouri Court has cited the Riggs case in one later decision
wherein a posed photograph was held inadmissible without discus-
sion,'8 both the opinion in the Riggs case and in the later case seem
to ignore an earlier Missouri decision admitting posed photo-
graphs.19
The Oklahoma Court has long been firmly aligned with states
refusing to admit photographs of re-created scenes to illustrate
witnesses' testimony. That the court has often applied this rule to
exactly such situations is beyond question.20 But the first case in
the jurisdiction in which this rule was laid down2 ' involved photo-
graphs of hypothetical situations which the defendant claimed were
possible, and did not attempt to represent the actual situation as
described by the testimony of any witness to the scene. Moreover,
18Nunnelley's Adm'r v. Muth, 195 Ky. 352, 242 S.W. 622 (1922); Square
Deal Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 307 Ky 135, 210 S.W.2d. 340 (1948).17 216 Mo. 304, 115 S.W. 969 (1908).
"Lynch v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 333 Mo. 89, 61 S.W.2d. 918
(1933).
1' State v. O'Reilly, 126 Mo. 597, 29 S.W. 577 (1895).
"0 Massey v. Ivester, 168 Okla. 464, 33 P.2d. 765 (1934); Defiance Oils,
Inc. v. Hardzog, 178 Okla. 6, 61 P.2d. 572 (1936).
21 Colonial Refining Co. v. Lathrop, 64 Okla. 47, 166 Pac. 747 (1917).
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recent cases indicate that the Oklahoma Court is at times ill at ease
under the rule.
22
It is not suggested, nor could it properly be, that the scant dis-
cussion above of a few particular cases shows generally that the
whole line of decisions holding posed photographs inadmissible is
based upon false precedents. Such is not the case. However, the
fact remains that some of the leading cases cited as authority for
the inadmissibility of posed photographs do not actually stand for
the proposition that such pictures are to be excluded where they are
offered as mere illustration of a witness' testimony.
Preferable Approach
Supported, then, by both the sounder reasoning and the weight
of authority, our conclusion must be that the better rule admits
posed photographs. These photographs must always, of course,
meet the rules pertaining to admissibility of photographs in gen-
eral.2 3 Most courts say the determination of whether a photograph
meets these standards is largely a question for the trial judge.2 4
"Whether it is sufficiently verified, whether it appears to
be fairly representative of the object portrayed, and
whether it may be useful to the jury, are preliminary
questions addressed to the trial judge."25
As has been previously suggested, the trial judge should con-
sider additional issues when determining the admissibility of posed
photographs. Beyond the ordinary questions he must determine
whether the photograph is merely being used to illustrate testi-
mony, whether the photograph is a fair illustration of what the
witness actually testifies to, and whether the usefulness to the jury
of the particular photograph is sufficient to offset any possibility of
fraud in its inception. To decide the first two of these questions,
the trial judge will need only a brief preliminary examination.
The third question is not so easy of ascertainment, but will depend
on the complexity or simplicity of the fact situation involved, the
extent to which that situation and the claims of each party have
already been made clear to the jury, and the trial judge's own
determination of the danger of fraud involved.
22 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Curtis, 199 Okla. 525, 188 P.2d. 199 (1947);
Langley v. State, 90 Okla. Cr. Rep. 310, 213 P.2d. 886 (Cr. Ct. of App. 1950);
Patrick v. Siliskls 105 Okla. 51, 222 Pac. 543 (1924).
" Wigmore, op. cit. supra note 2, § 792.
2
, ibid.
" Babb v. Oxford Paper Co., 99 Me. 298, 302, 59 Atl. 290, 292 (1904).
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Having weighed these various considerations and reached a
conclusion, the trial judge should be careful to properly instruct
the jury on the matter. Before the posed photographs are ad-
mitted, and again in the final instruction, the point should be made
clear that such photographs are not evidence and have no probative
weight, but are mere pictoral representations of the testimony of
one witness, credible only to the extent that the particular witness
is considered credible by the jury. Counsel for the introducing
party can be of service here by making clear to the court that
photographs are intended to be merely illustrative of testimony.20
So handled by counsel and the courts, posed photographs will
be a valuable aid in presenting testimony, and may help to present
to the jury a more comprehensible view of the theories and conten-
tions advanced by the parties to an action.
6 An excellent illustration of this is found in Pearce v. Rodell, 283 Mich. 19,
276 N.W. 883 (1937).
